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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) in Europe have grown substantially over the last decade, 
but Italian regions accounted for a very small portion of such increase. This finding rises two 
questions: i) why did Italian regions attract such a low number of foreign investors?; ii) was it 
a regional or a country problem? 
One explanation for this pattern could be that the characteristics of Italian regions were not 
attractive to foreign multinationals. In other words, Italian regions might have a low potential 
to attract FDI so that they have indeed received the ‘right’ amount of investments given their 
observable characteristics. This line of reasoning has been put forward in a recent study on 
the attractiveness of Italy to foreign multinationals, which highlighted that Italian regions and 
provinces  score  very  low  on  all  the  main  determinants  of  FDI  attraction,  relative  to  the 
leading European areas (Siemens-Ambrosetti, 2003).  
A different, although not alternative, explanation is that Italian regions might have been 
‘doomed’  by  sharing  common  national  policies  and  institutions  (such  as  tax  regimes, 
efficiency of bureaucracy, degree of labour market regulation and effectiveness of the legal 
and property right protection system) which discouraged foreign firms to locate their plants in 
Italy. This view follows a recent stream of cross-country studies which have addressed the 
role  of  institutional  and  policy  characteristics  as  determinants  of  inward  FDI  (see,  e.g., 
Nicoletti et al., 2003).
1 Along these lines, a few recent surveys carried out among investors 
and  opinion  makers  have  suggested  that  Italy  underperforms  with  respect  to  other  EU 
countries in the characteristics of the labour market institutions, the quality and efficiency of 
the public administration and of the legal system, the fiscal burden on companies, and other 
national institutional aspects (Committeri, 2004; Business International, 2001). Consistently, 
in a recent paper, Basile, Castellani and Zanfei (2003) have analyzed location choices of 
multinational firms in EU regions and have found that profits foreign firms extract from their 
investments in Italian regions are positively correlated. One way to interpret this result is that 
a common element which affects the attractiveness of all Italian regions which they call the 
‘country effect’.  
We use the number of new foreign affiliates, disaggregated by the 52 NUTS 1 regions of 
the 5 largest EU countries and by the 20 2-digits SIC industries, as a proxy for inward FDI in 
                                                 
1 The question whether Italian regions are doomed recalls a paper written by Nicoletti (2002), where the author 
underlines that “Italy is an outlier among OECD economies when it comes to institutions” (p. 129). He argues 
that institutional settings in product and labour markets have determined a situation in which this country has 
relatively low domestic competitive pressures, a distorted industry structure, and unsatisfactory performance in 
attracting FDI flows.   3
the 1991-1999 period to extend Basile et al. (2003) results. In particular, we contribute to the 
above discussion by addressing three questions. First, we model the potential attractiveness of 
EU regions in terms of their main observable characteristics and investigate whether Italian 
regions attract more or less than their potential. In other words, we ask whether a EU region 
with the same characteristics of an Italian region is likely to attract a different amount of FDI. 
Second, we evaluate the impact of some national policy and institutional characteristics on 
the attractiveness of regions and we assess to what extent such factors help explaining the 
Italian specificity. Third, we will simulate the relative contribution of regional and national 
variables to FDI in Italian regions. This exercise helps us assessing to what extent the low 
attractiveness  of  Italian  regions  during  the  nineties  was  the  result  of  specific  regional 
characteristics or of countrywide factors. Our results suggest that indeed Italian regions are 
‘doomed’ by a negative country effect which, according to some of our estimates reduces the 
attractiveness of Italian regions to foreign investors by some 40%. In other words, a region 
‘within the Italian borders’ would attract 40% less multinational firms than a region with 
similar observable characteristics (i.e. a similar inward FDI potential) in any of the other 4 
EU  country  in  our  sample.  This  lower  attractiveness  seems  to  be  associated  with  some 
national institutional characteristics. In particular the efficiency of bureaucracy and the ability 
of the legal system to adequately enforce property rights play a key role in attracting FDI, 
while tax competition does not appear to be a very effective policy measure, in presence of 
significant  agglomeration  forces.  However,  national  variables  can  have  some  asymmetric 
effect on Italian regions, and it seems that, for example, reducing corporate taxes, as well as 
the  tax  wedge  on  labour  might  have  some  positive  impact  on  FDI,  although  limited  to 
Southern regions. Finally, some simulations suggest that an increase in inward FDI could be 
achieved though policy intervention on some regional variables, but the order of magnitude 
of such effect seems much lower than the one obtained by removing the national ‘dooming’ 
effect.  
This paper is not the first one that analyses location choices of multinational firms in Italy. 
Some other works have addressed the question of why some regions and provinces attract 
more FDI than other regions within Italy (Mariotti and Piscitello, 1995; Basile, 2002 and 
2004; Bronzini, 2004). However, in the present work we frame the choice of whether to 
locate in Italy in the broader context of locating in the EU. In other words, we model the 
decision process of a firm which plans to carry out some foreign production in Europe and 
has  to  choose  the  location  of  such  an  activity.  In  this  perspective,  within  an  integrated 
economic space, such as the EU, regions belonging to different countries may well compete   4
to attract foreign investments, therefore the analysis of the determinants of location within 
single countries might overlook such inter-country competition. Along the same lines, the 
focus on a single country does not allow one to evaluate the contribution of national versus 
regional factors to location of FDI. This issue can be particularly relevant for targeting an 
appropriate policy to attract foreign multinationals. In fact, in recent years regional policies 
have become very important in the context of FDI policy and investment promotion agencies 
have been established in many regions, in Italy as well as in other EU countries. However, to 
the extent that regional  potential is doomed by  national policy  and institutions, one may 
wonder whether it would be more efficient to carry out such a policy at the country level.  
This paper also relates to a number of works on cross-country determinants of FDI, which 
focus on the role of institutional characteristics and national policy, but are not able to assess 
the  role  of  regional  diversity  within  countries.  The  combined  emphasis  on  national  and 
regional determinants comes at the cost of a limited variety in country heterogeneity (relative 
to cross-country studies) and a more aggregated regional analysis (relative to single country 
location studies).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relative performance 
of Italian regions in attracting FDI in Europe, and reports new evidence in favour of the 
existence  of  a  country  effect  which  might  have  hindered  new  foreign  entries  in  Italian 
regions. Section 3 focuses on the role played by national institutional characteristics, such as 
efficiency in public administration, labor market regulation, legal system and property right 
protection, as well as labor and corporate taxation, in determining such a country effect. In 
particular, we first provide a brief review of the literature on FDI and institutions; then, some 
descriptive evidence on the relative position of Italy in the characteristics of national policies 
and institutions is reported, and finally an econometric analysis of the impact of national 
policy  variables  on  the  location  of  foreign  multinationals  in  EU  regions  is  performed, 
stressing also the existence of regional asymmetric effects. Sections 4 illustrates the results of 
simulations  where  we  investigate  how  much  would  FDI  rise  (or  drop)  should  some 
characteristics of Italian regions reach the EU average. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Location  of  foreign  multinationals  in  Europe:  are  Italian  regions 
doomed? 
 
During  the  nineties,  the  EU  has  attracted  a  large  share  of  world’s  FDI  flows,  which 
accounted for a significant proportion of total investment in the area. About 40% of world’s   5
FDI has been directed towards EU countries in the 1991-1999 period, accounting for a share 
of gross-fixed capital formation (GFCF henceforth) which has increased from 6.2% in 1991 
to 28.5% in 1999. However, this increasing inflow of FDI has not been equally distributed 
across countries and regions. In particular, among the largest countries, Italy turned out to 
attract a persistently lower share of FDI flows. Over the 1991-1999 period, FDI accounted 
only for 1.8% of the Italian GFCF, while the EU average has been above 9%. By the late 90s 
the lag of Italy has become even larger: in 1999 the share of FDI on GFCF was 3.1% in Italy, 
while in Spain, Germany, and France it reached 10.9%, 12.4% and 17.2% respectively, not to 
mention the United Kingdom where FDI inflows accounted for 34.9% of GFCF. The regional 
distribution of FDI looks even more unequal. Using a new dataset (the Elios dataset described 
in Appendix 1) on the location choices of foreign affiliates in Europe, we map the regional 
distribution of multinational manufacturing  firms established in Europe in the 1991-1999 
period (see Figure 1). During the period considered, the number of new foreign affiliates was 
concentrated in the core regions of France, Germany, and the UK, alongside with Cataluna 
and  Comunidad  de  Madrid  in  Spain  and  Lombardy  in  Italy,  whereas  peripheral  regions 
attracted a considerably lower share of multinationals. The peculiarity of Italy emerged also 
in this context: while Lombardy attracted a considerable number of foreign firms, all other 
Italian regions were characterised by very few newly established subsidiaries. No other EU 
country  showed  such  a  uniformly  distributed  performance.  In  other  words,  this  simple 
descriptive analysis is consistent with the idea that a ‘country effect’ might have lowered the 
attractiveness of (almost) all regions within the Italian national boundaries.  
Figure 1 about here 
A  more  robust  evidence  on  a  ‘country  effect’  in  the  case  of  Italian  regions  has  been 
provided by Basile et al. (2003), who fitted a nested logit model on an extended version of 
the  dataset  used  in  this  paper,  to  evaluate  whether  national  boundaries  affect  location 
decisions  and  to  what  extent  multinational  firms  consider  regions  belonging  to  different 
countries  as  close  substitutes.  The  analysis  provided  empirical  support  to  the  view  that 
country boundaries do not matter (i.e. multinational firms consider regions across countries as 
closer substitutes than regions within national boundaries) with the exception of Italy. In fact, 
their results suggest that foreign firms take their location decision on a presumption that 
investments in Italian regions would yield systematically lower profits than investments in 
regions  from  other  countries  sharing  similar  observable  characteristics.  Such  a  ‘country 
effect’  appeared  particularly  strong  in  the  case  of  US  multinationals.  Thus,  a  relatively   6
advanced region in Italy such as, for example, Emilia Romagna might be perceived by US 
MNEs as more similar to Italy’s Mezzogiorno than, for example, to Baden-Wurttenberg.  
In this paper we go beyond Basile et al. (2003) findings by testing whether or not Italian 
regions indeed attracted less FDI than their potential would suggest and whether national 
characteristics can explain this result. To this end, we counted new establishments in each of 
52 NUTS 1 regions by sector (2-digits SIC) over three consecutive periods in the 90s (1991-
1993,  1994-1996,  1997-1999).  Since  the  dependent  variable  is  a  count,  varying  across 
regions, sectors and time, we estimate our model as a negative binomial and we use random 
effect panel data techniques.  
 
2.1 The role of regional characteristics in attracting FDI in EU regions 
 
In Table 1 we first assess for the role of regional characteristics in attracting FDI in EU 
regions (column 1). The key variables that the literature suggests as the main determinants of 
location of foreign firms have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero 
(see the Appendix 1, Tables A.1 and Table A.2, for a list of variables, data sources, and 
descriptive statistics).  In particular, regional market size  and market potential (higher  for 
regions which are close to large markets) have a strong impact on location, confirming the 
‘market access’ hypothesis. Agglomeration economies, stemming from the overall number of 
firms and from foreign firms in a region-sector, have the expected positive and significant 
sign,  whereby  corroborating  the  prediction  of  New  Economic  Geography  models.  High 
wages seem to discourage FDI, while high R&D intensity and schooling rate attract foreign 
investors. The extent of transport infrastructures, which can be thought also as an indicator 
of regional policy (although not under complete control of regional institutions), is also an 
important determinant of location.  
- Table 1 about here - 
2.2 Do Italian regions attract less FDI than their potential? 
 
After defining the main determinants of the regional potential attractiveness to foreign 
investors,  we  then  investigate  whether  Italian  regions  indeed  attract  less  than  their  EU 
counterparts with similar observable characteristics (column 2). In particular, we augment our 
basic  model  introducing  dummies  for  macro-areas  in  Italy:  North-West  (split  between 
Lombardy and other North-West regions), North-East, Centre, and South. We find strong 
evidence  that,  with  the  exception  of  Lombardy,  the  region  where  around  one  half  of   7
multinationals in Italy locate (ICE, 2004), all Italian macro-areas attract significantly less 
than their potential would suggest (results for the single NUTS 1 regions are qualitatively 
similar and are not shown just to save space).  
This  result  might  depend  on  the  fact  that  we  actually  did  not  measure  the  potential 
attractiveness of regions accurately, and the area dummy picks up such unobserved regional 
characteristics.
2 Alternatively, the regional dummy could be absorbing the negative effect of 
‘being an Italian region’. In fact, the results reported in column 3, where a single dummy for 
all Italian regions suggest that overall, they attract considerably less (39%) than their EU 
counterparts  with  similar  characteristics.
3  In  other  words,  it  could  be  that  the  lower 
attractiveness of Italian regions does not depend on some regional characteristics which are 
missing from our specification (e.g. the presence and effectiveness of investment promotion 
agencies), but on a country effect which depresses investment in all Italian regions.  
 
2.3 Are Italian regions doomed? 
 
In Table 1 we want to test the hypothesis that Italian regions are doomed by the fact of 
being  located  in  Italy.  We  test  this  hypothesis  by  looking  at  the  regional  effect  after 
controlling for the country effect. In other words, once controlled for the fact that ‘being 
within the Italian borders’ reduces the overall potential of a region, we ask whether Italian 
regions attract less than their counterparts with similar characteristics. Columns 4-8 suggest 
that once the fact that Italian regions are doomed is accounted for, Northern and Southern 
regions do not attract a significantly  different  number of investments  as their observable 
characteristics would predict, Lombardy attracts even more than its observable potential and 
only in the case of Central regions we observe that the number of foreign investments is 
actually significantly lower than it would be expected from the regional potential.  
In turn, this finding opens the question of why Italian regions are doomed and which 
country characteristics determine the overall lower attractiveness. Theoretical literature and 
previous  surveys  seem  to  point  to  the  national  institutional  framework  and  country-level 
public policy.  
 
 
                                                 
2  It  is,  however,  important  to  remind  that  we  use  a  random  effect  model,  which  controls  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity of each region/sector. 
3 In a negative binomial regression model, the percentage change in the dependent variable due to a dummy 
variables taking a value of 1 instead of 0 is measured by [exp(b)-1]*100.   8
3. The role of national institutions in MNCs’ location choices 
 
3.1 Institutions and FDI: theoretical and empirical background 
 
Several cross-regional studies have investigated the role of regional policies in affecting 
location choices of multinational firms. In particular, this literature has emphasized the role 
of regional promotion incentives (such as financial, tax, and labor-promotion incentives) and 
of  public  infrastructures  in  affecting  a  foreign  firm’s  cost  function  and  thus  its  location 
decision.
4 On the contrary, due to the lack of data, these studies have disregarded the effect of 
national  policies  and  national  institutional  settings  on  regions’  performance  in  attracting 
foreign  investors.  However,  it  is  well  recognized  that  country  specific  policies  and 
institutional factors can have important symmetric or even asymmetric effects on the regional 
distribution of FDI.  
Conversely, the effect of national institutional variables on inward FDI has been widely 
analysed  in  cross-country  studies,  which  recognise  that  the  host-country  institutions  and 
policies affect the entry decision of multinational firms
5. Following the existing literature, 
these variables can be grouped in six categories: 1) labour market arrangements, 2) corporate 
taxation, 3) bureaucratic efficiency and corruption, 4) legal system and intellectual property 
right protection, 5) product market regulation and 6) openness to FDI. However, as Nicoletti 
et al. (2003) point out, product market regulations that restrict competition and barriers to 
foreign investment in OECD countries are confined mainly to energy and marketable service 
industries. Since our study is restricted to manufacturing industries, we do not consider these 
particular institutional aspects in the following analysis.  
1)  Labour-market  arrangements  –  A  wide  set  of  policies  and  institutions  affect  the 
functioning  of  the  labour  market  impinging  on  FDI  transactions.  Generally  speaking, 
empirical  studies  focus  on  the  tightness  of  the  employment  protection  legislation  (EPL 
henceforth), the collective bargaining mechanisms, and the labour income taxation (typically, 
the tax wedge on labour). Görg (2002), Gross and Ryan (2004), Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2005), and Nicoletti et al. (2003) find empirical support to the idea that EPL and labour 
taxes adversely affect relative returns from investing in a country with a tight regulation, 
                                                 
4 See, for examples, Head, Ries and Swenson (1999), Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2003), Crozet, Mayer and 
Mucchielli (2003), Barrios, Gorg and Strobl (2003), Basile et al. (2004). Examples of works focussing on public 
infrastructure are Basile (2004) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). 
5 In principle, causality may run in the other direction so that the actual operation of a foreign firm affects the 
host-country institutions and policies, especially when the multinational achieves a strong position in the host 
economy. However, this is more likely to occur in developing countries than in developed countries.   9
whereby  discouraging  FDIs.  Lee  (2003)  observes,  however,  that  the  effects  of  EPL  and 
labour income taxation on FDI may depend on the regime of industrial relations in place in 
each country.  
2) Corporate taxation
6 – The corporate tax system has an obvious theoretical relation with 
inward  FDI:  higher  tax  rates  increase  the  cost  of  doing  business  in  a  country,  whereby 
reducing the attractiveness of such location. However, the empirical evidence on the impact 
of the corporate tax rate on inward FDI and foreign firms location choices is mixed (see, e.g., 
Devereux and Griffith, 1998, 2003; and Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000). In fact, a number of 
issues arise when estimating the effect of tax regimes on international investments. First, the 
correct measurement of the effective corporate tax rate is not trivial given available data; 
second, tax schemes differ across countries (i.e. full credit vs. exemption schemes); third, 
firms might “accept higher taxes if they are associated with better infrastructures or public 
services”  (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000, p. 7), so that tax differences could not matter for 
location decisions if they simply balance differences in public goods; fourth, and foremost 
agglomeration forces make tax competition too costly because they can be counteracted only 
by very large differences in tax rates. In particular, as shown, among others, in Baldwin et al. 
(2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004), agglomeration forces create quasi-rents that can be 
taxed without inducing delocation.  
3)  Corruption  and  bureaucratic  efficiency  –  Corrupt  behaviour  among  government 
officials  is  an  informal  institution  that  can  arise  when  market  economy  institutions  are 
underdeveloped, and produce high transaction costs that increase the MNE’s costs of doing 
business in the host country. Such extra-costs decrease the expected profitability of an MNE 
direct investment and tend to deter foreign investors from starting production in the host 
country.  Recent  studies  (Wei,  2000;  Johnson  and  Dahlström,  2004)  provide  empirical 
evidence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  host-country  corruption  and  FDI  inflows. 
Hakkala, Norback and Svaleryd (2003), however, observe that the effect of corruption may 
vary with the composition of the investment flows. A similar effect can be expected to stem 
from an inefficient bureaucracy. In fact, lengthy and sloppy bureaucratic procedures increase 
the cost of operating business, reducing the attractiveness of the country to foreign investors.  
4) Legal system and intellectual property right protection – The relationship between 
intellectual property rights protection and FDI is very complex. On the one hand, a weak 
protection  increases  the  probability  of  imitation  and  thus  it  makes  a  host  country  less 
                                                 
6 In most European countries, fiscal (tax) policies do not have a regional dimension, since European Community 
rules consider a regional differentiation in labour and capital taxes as a distortion of competition. Thus, even tax 
policies must be regarded as national policies.    10
attractive for foreign investors. On the other hand, strong protection may shift the preference 
of MNEs from FDI towards licensing. Nicoletti et al. (2003) do not find a robust effect of the 
lack of intellectual property rights protection in the host country on FDI. However, this result 
might depend on the sample of countries used and on the sector analysed. Javorcik (2004), 
for example, examines the impact of intellectual property protection on the volume of FDI 
using  a  firm-level  data  set  from  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  and 
demonstrates that weak protection deters foreign investors in technology-intensive sectors 
where intellectual property rights play an important role.  
More generally, the extent to which a country can enforce property rights can be a key 
determinant of its attractiveness towards foreign investors. In fact, a strong IPR protection 
system needs to be implemented through an efficient legal system, which ensures that firms 
can have their contracts, trademarks and patents enforced without entering into exhausting 
trials lasting several years.  
 
3.2 Overview of national institutions and policies in the 5 largest EU countries 
 
Nicoletti (2002) observes that “Italy is an outlier among OECD economies when it comes 
to institutions” (p. 129). In particular, he emphasizes that product and labour markets are 
more regulated in Italy than in most of its trading partners, legal rules and their enforcement 
are  relatively  weak  and  that,  at  the  same  time,  Italy  shares  broadly  similar  bargaining 
arrangements and social policies with many other European countries. He also argues that 
due to this situation, Italy has relatively little inflow of FDI.  
In  this  paper,  we  aim  at  testing  this  prediction  using  data  on  country  policy  and 
institutional settings. The first issue that one needs to take into account when testing the 
impact of institutions and policies on economic performance is that reliable measures of such 
characteristics  are  not  easy  to  find,  due  to  the  fact  that  most  of  them  are  not  directly 
observable or are multifaceted concepts which can hardly be captured by a single indicator. 
Furthermore,  the  fact  that  for  the  present  analysis  information  over  the  past  decade  was 
required (at least three observations for each country over the nineties), a number of surveys 
which  have  been  carried  out  only  in  recent  years  (such  as  data  from  the  Economist 
Intelligence Unit and some OECD data) cannot be used. However, we believe that we were 
able to collect rather reliable information from four authoritative sources such as the OECD 
for data on tax wedge on labour, IFS (Institute for Fiscal Studies) for data on the effective 
average  corporate  tax  rate,  IMD’s  World  Competitiveness  Yearbook  for  data  on  labour   11
regulation  (in  particular,  EPL)  and  on  bureaucratic  efficiency,  and  data  from  the  Global 
Competitiveness  Report  (published  by  the  Frazer  Institute)  on  the  legal  system  and  the 
intellectual property right protection. Definitions of each variable are reported at the bottom 
of Table 2, which provides an overview on the different institutional characteristics for the 5 
countries in our sample.  
- Table 2 about here - 
Although there are several dimensions to labour market arrangements (see Nicoletti, 2002, 
and Lee, 2003), we focus on two specific items, namely the tax wedge on labour and the 
EPL, which several cross-country studies have shown to be the most important variables 
impinging inward FDI. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that France, Germany and Italy have 
higher levels of tax wedge on labour than the United Kingdom and Spain. Moreover, while 
the UK and Spain maintained the tax wedge quite stable during the period, the other countries 
raised their taxation level. In particular, in Italy the tax wedge increased from an average 
level of 35.6% registered in 1991 to 45.4% registered in 1997.  
The  IMD  data  on  labour  regulation  confirm  the  commonly  held  view  that  there  are 
substantial differences between EU economies in hiring and firing restrictions and, in general, 
in the EPL. To interpret these data, notice that the IMD variables are normalised and range 
from 0 to 10 and that higher values denote less restrictive legislations. Therefore, during the 
nineties the regulatory environment has been much less strict in the UK than in the other four 
European  countries,  while  Italian  and  Spanish  labour  markets  are  characterised  by  the 
strongest employment protection. Furthermore, while Spain and the UK have improved their 
position over time, Italy, Germany, and France have scored lower levels during the last part 
of the nineties. As for Italy, Nicoletti (2002) also observes that while hiring and firing costs 
for  temporary  contracts  have  been  partially  reduced  during  the  nineties,  EPL  for  both 
permanent and fixed-term workers remained more restrictive than in the European average.  
Differences  in  fiscal  policies  among  EU  countries  are  also  quite  remarkable.  Table  2 
reports IFS data on the effective average corporate tax rate proposed by Devereux and 
Griffith (2003).
7 It turns out rather clearly that Italy shares the highest tax rates with Germany 
but, while for this country a downward trend is observed, in the case of Italy taxes have been 
                                                 
7 Devereux and Griffith (1999) observed that the evaluation of the impact of fiscal policy on investment choices 
differ  according  to  the  type  of  investment  decision  considered. In  the  case  of  marginal  investment  choices 
(typically,  how  much  to  invest,  given  a  diminishing  expected  return),  the  impact  of  tax  policies  must  be 
measures by an effective marginal tax rate. In the case of discrete investment choices, such as the location 
decision of multinationals, the impact of tax policies must be measured by an effective average tax rate, which is 
shown to be equal to a weighted average of an effective marginal tax rate and an adjusted statutory tax rate, 
where the weights depend on the profitability of the investment (Devereux and Griffith, 2003).   12
rising over the first half of the decade. On the  contrary, Spain have steadily  reduced its 
effective average corporate tax rate.  
As for bureaucratic efficiency, although important reforms have been carried out in Italy 
in  the  90s  in  order  to  simplify  the  procedures  of  public  administration,  the  international 
comparison  based  on  IMD  data  confirms  that  this  country  scores  very  low  along  this 
dimension. Furthermore, while Spain and the UK show an improvement of their score during 
the period, Italy, France, and Germany scored a lower level
8. 
Finally, Table 1 reports data on the legal system and the intellectual property right 
protection extracted from the dataset compiled by the Frazer Institute. Like the IMD data, 
these  data  range  from  0  to  10  and  an  increase  of  the  indicator  correspond  to  a  higher 
protection.  According  to  this  source,  Germany  had  the  best  legal  system  throughout  the 
period, while France and the UK improved substantially from 1991 to 1997. On the contrary, 
Italy  and  Spain  scored  rather  low  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineties  and  do  not  show  any 
significant improvement.  
Summing up, Table 2 depicts a situation in which several Italian institutions and policies 
appear quite peculiar, confirming the conclusions of Nicoletti (2002), which was confined to 
product and labour market institutions. In the following, we extend the econometric analysis 
of section 2 in order to assess to what extent this peculiar institutional and policy framework 
can  explain  the  low  performance  of  Italian  regions  in  attracting  foreign  multinationals. 
Furthermore,  we  will  be  able  to  investigate  whether,  once  controlled  for  time  invariant 
country  characteristics,  institutional  and  national  policy  change  can  explain  the  changing 
distribution of FDI flows across EU regions.  
 
3.3 The role of national institutions for MNCs location in EU regions: regression 
results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of 7 regressions, which build on the specification of column 3 
in Table 1 and aim at testing the impact of nation-wide policies and institutions on FDI.  
- Table 3 about here - 
Results broadly support our prior on the impact of the different institutional characteristics 
on multinational firms’ location choices. In particular, when we add our measures of national 
policy individually to the baseline specification of column 3 in Table 1 (in columns 9-13) we 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that 1991 data was missing and we had to estimate this value using 1994 data. This causes a 
substantially lower variability of this characteristic over time.   13
find that: higher taxes on labour and a tighter legislation on hiring and firing practices have a 
negative  impact  on  FDI,  whereas  efficient  bureaucracy  and  legal  system  attract  foreign 
multinationals. Lower corporate taxes do not seem to be associated to a significant increase in 
foreign investments but, as we will show later in this section this might have to do with the 
fact the tax competition is less effective in presence of strong agglomerative forces.   
More interestingly, for the purpose of this paper, the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
dummy identifying Italian regions drops when we control for the nature of the legal system 
and the tightness of labour regulations and becomes even not significantly different from zero 
when controlling for the efficiency of bureaucracy, suggesting that the various institutional 
characteristics capture at least part of the Italian specificity.  
When we introduce the various country characteristics jointly (column 14), we  find that 
also the combination of country characteristics capture the Italian specificity, but then only 
legal system and bureaucracy remain significant and with the expected sign. As a robustness 
check,  in  column  1  of  Table  4,  we  substitute  the  dummy  for  Italian  regions  with  five 
dummies indicating the geographical area where each Italian region is located and find that, 
once controlled for national institutional characteristics, these indicators are not significantly 
different from zero. In other words, results are consistent with the idea that the lower number 
of foreign investments in Italian regions, relative to other European regions, has to do with 
the  specificity  in  institutions  and  national  policies.  In  particular,  the  efficiency  of  the 
bureaucratic  apparatus  and  of  the  legal  system  turn  out  as  two  key  determinants  of 
attractiveness to foreign investors, and we support the idea that the relative gap of Italy in 
these  dimensions  has  significantly  discouraged  multinationals  from  locating  in  Italian 
regions.  
The fact that differences in labour and corporate taxes do not explain differences in inward 
FDI, might seem rather odd, given the importance that fiscal variables play in almost any 
country policy towards FDI. However, as reported in Benassy-Quere et al. (2003) existing 
evidence on the role of tax competition on FDI is rather mixed, and one recurrent explanation 
is that in presence of agglomeration forces only very large tax differentials provide the right 
incentive to delocalise economic activities. This finding is not new in the empirical literature 
(see,  for  example,  Head,  Ries  and  Swenson,  1999)  and  is  in  line  with  the  theoretical 
predictions of some recent new economic geography models which cast some doubt on the 
traditional wisdom that producers should move to whichever country (region) has the lowest 
tax rates, and suggest that agglomeration forces create quasi-rents that can be taxed without 
inducing delocation (see, e.g., Baldwin et al. 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). To test for   14
this hypothesis, in column (15) of Table 3 we drop our two measures of agglomeration from 
the  final  specification.  Results  remain  qualitatively  similar  for  the  regional  variables: 
although  some  coefficients  change  in  magnitude,  as  they  pick  up  some of  the  effects  of 
agglomeration forces, the sign and significance are virtually unchanged. On the contrary, as 
concerns  national  policy  and  institutional  characteristics,  we  observe  that  now  both  the 
corporate tax rate and the tax wedge on labour enter with a negative and very significant sign. 
In other words, we support the hypothesis that, whenever agglomeration economies play a 
role in affecting firms’ location decisions, tax competition is not the more effective policy 
measure to affect the attraction of multinational firms.  
 
3.4 The asymmetric impact of institutions on laggard regions 
 
The empirical results discussed above allowed us to identify some basic determinants of 
the  weak  capability  of  the  Italian  system  to  attract  foreign  investors  and  to  answer  the 
question  of  why  Italian  regions  are  doomed.  However,  those  results  are  based  on  the 
presumption  that  national  institutions  and  policies  (namely,  the  tax  regimes,  the  labour 
market regulation, the legal system and the bureaucratic efficiency) have a symmetric effect 
on  all  regions  within  each  country.  For  instance,  these  results  imply  that  lowering  the 
corporate tax rate does not affect, on average, foreign firms’ decision to invest in Italian 
regions, or that raising the quality of the legal system or bureaucracy affect homogenously 
the attractiveness of Northern and Southern areas of the country. However, these effects need 
not be symmetric across regions.  
In fact, the issue of the regional asymmetric effect of national policies is widely discussed 
in the literature (e.g. Nicoletti, 2002). The basic idea is that whenever significant regional 
imbalances  within  a  country  exists,  such  as  in  the  Italian  case,  national  policies  and 
institutions, which tend to be designed around the characteristics of the median voter, can 
create different constraints for laggard regions. For instance, the (high) level of the tax wedge 
and  degree  of  regulation  on  the  labour  market  in  Italy  mainly  reflects  the  economic 
conditions  of  the  leading  (Northern)  regions  and  it  is  much  more  inadequate  for  the 
development conditions and the location disadvantages of Southern Italy. Similarly, setting a 
relatively high corporate tax rate across all regions might adversely affect laggard regions 
which  can  hardly  compensate  for  this  relative  cost  disadvantage  with  other  locational 
characteristics. Therefore, we can expect that this situation tends to generate asymmetrical 
effects, i.e. to create a higher constraint for the regional attractiveness of external investments   15
and, thus, for job creation in the South. The hypothesis of asymmetric effects can be put 
forward also for other national policy and institution, including bureaucratic efficiency and 
the legal system. It is indeed possible that an inefficient bureaucratic apparatus or a weak 
legal system affect more heavily the FDI attractiveness of a backward region than that of a 
leading  region,  just  because  the  latter  has  some  unobserved  characteristics  which  partly 
compensate the countrywide institutional weakness.  
We  investigate  whether  institutional  characteristics  have  asymmetric  effects  on  Italian 
regions  by  augmenting  the  specification  of  column  1  in  Table  4  with  interaction  terms 
between Italian regional dummies (Lombardy, the other North-Western regions, the North-
East, the Centre and the South) and our five institutional/policy variables. These interactions 
should  capture  the  extent  to  which  national  institutions  have  a  different  impact  on  the 
attractiveness of different regions. The main result of this analysis is that, while the high 
national corporate tax rate does not represent a common factor that helps explain the low 
attractiveness of Italy as a whole, it can be considered as a location constraint for the South of 
country. There is also some (less robust) evidence that a lower tax wedge on labour and a 
stronger legal system would benefit the South more than the rest of the country and that a 
weaker labour regulation would be less effective in Lombardia than in the other regions.  
- Table 4 about here - 
4. Simulating the impact of the Italian lag on inward FDI 
 
The final step of our empirical investigation consists in some simulations on the impact 
that  a  change  in  the  observable  characteristics  of  Italian  regions  would  have  on  their 
attractiveness. On the basis of the estimates from the regressions above, we compute how the 
predicted number of foreign investments in Italian regions would have changed if some of the 
regional characteristics had been set to the average level for the other four EU countries. This 
will provide a rough indication of what would be the impact of a policy intervention aimed at 
improving regional characteristics to EU standard. However, this exercise will also tell us 
something about the differential impact of regional vs. national policy. In fact, we know from 
Table 1 that, given observable regional characteristics, Italian regions attract 39% less than 
their  potential.  Therefore,  this  is  our  benchmark  for  the  contribution  of  national 
characteristics  to  regional  attractiveness.  Assessing  the  contribution  of  regional 
characteristics will give us a rough indication of the extent to which the low level of FDI in 
Italian regions is due to the country effect or to the low regional potential.    16
Table 5 reports the results of our simulation exercise
9. The relatively low wages seem to 
exert a strong influence on Italian ability to attract FDI. In fact, raising the wage bill to the 
EU average would determine a fall in foreign investments from 4% in Lombardy to 37% in 
Southern regions. Conversely, a sharp increase in FDI flows would occur if Italian regions 
could  manage  to  raise  their  R&D  investments  and  schooling  rate  and  to  improve  their 
transport  infrastructures.  Overall,  these  simulations  suggest  that  attractiveness  of  Italian 
regions could be substantially increased by improving some regional characteristics, such as 
R&D activities, education and infrastructures. However, the magnitude of the increase in FDI 
from these policies turns out as relatively low if compared with the large negative impact of 
national characteristics.  
- Table 5 about here - 
5. Conclusions 
 
This  paper  tries  to  shed  light  on  the  following  question:  why,  despite  the  growing 
importance of FDI in the EU, Italian regions have attracted very few foreign investors over 
the  nineties?  We  have  argued  that  this  might  be  explained  by  individual  regions’ 
characteristics or by some ‘country effect’ affecting all Italian regions. Although the two 
explanation are not necessarily alternative, the first would suggest that Italian regions have a 
low potential to attract FDI and they attract the ‘right’ amount given their characteristics, 
whereas the second line of reasoning would argue that Italian regions are doomed by the 
‘country effect’ and indeed attract less than their potential.  
Using data on location choices of multinational firms in 52 EU regions (in the 5 largest 
countries) over the 1991-1999 period, we provide strong evidence that Italian regions attract 
significantly less than their observable characteristics would suggest. Following a growing 
literature on the role of institutions on FDI, we investigated to what extent this country effect 
can be explained by national policies and institutions, which might have discouraged foreign 
firms to locate their plants in Italy. Our findings suggest that an inefficient bureaucracy and a 
legal system inadequate in ensuring an efficient enforcement of property rights are the main 
characteristics which explain the low level of FDI in Italian regions as compared with other 
EU  locations.  Furthermore,  our  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  under  significant 
                                                 
9 Simulations have been computed by using the estimated coefficients of a random effect negative binomial 
regression of our FDI measure on regional and country characteristics, with sector dummies but without country 
dummies. Details on the methodology can be found in Appendix 2. Table 5 reports simulations for the main 
regional  characteristics.  Agglomeration  and  specialization  variables  have  not  been  reported  as  they  are 
regional/sectoral specific and aggregation across sectors posed some problems due to regions with very few FDI 
in a few sectors.   17
agglomeration  economies,  core  countries  can  tax  their  industry  at  a  higher  rate  than 
peripheral  countries  can,  without  letting  the  industry  go.  For  example,  the  high  Italian 
corporate tax rate cannot be considered as a “common factor” that help explain the low FDI 
attractiveness of the country as a whole. However, we also have econometric evidence that a 
high corporate tax rate may be a strong constraint for the Mezzogiorno of Italy while it has no 
effect for the rest of the country. In other words only the South would be advantaged from a 
reduction of the corporate tax rate.  
This  paper  therefore  suggests  that  Italian  regions  discount  a  strong  negative  effect 
stemming from the national institutional and policy framework. One of the implication of this 
result is that efforts made by regional institutions to improve the attractiveness of their area 
either  by  investing  in  enhancing  observable  characteristics,  such  as  schooling,  R&D 
investment,  infrastructures  and  wages,  or  by  improving  the  perceived  attractiveness  with 
image building, promotion and territorial marketing, might reveal as a Sisifo’s effort, to the 
extent that national obstacles depressing investments are not removed. In this perspective, 
national  policy  could  be  more  effective  in  attracting  foreign  investors.  Furthermore,  our 
evidence on asymmetric effects of national policies also raises the question of whether it is 
appropriate  within  a  country  with  significant  regional  imbalances  like  Italy  to  have  an 
homogenous corporate tax rate.  
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Figure 1 – Number of foreign subsidiaries established in 52 NUTS 1 regions in 5 EU 
countries, 1991-1999 
 
Source: Elaborations on Elios dataset (University of Urbino) 
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Table 1. – Regression results: Do Italian regions attract less FDI than their potential? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Market size  0.213  0.240  0.219  0.217  0.241  0.221  0.222  0.220 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Market potential  0.365  0.357  0.373  0.377  0.351  0.373  0.380  0.366 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Agglomeration  0.179  0.175  0.172  0.170  0.174  0.176  0.174  0.171 
(overall)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Agglomeration   0.652  0.592  0.634  0.636  0.590  0.629  0.626  0.631 
(foreign)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Wage  -0.780  -0.754  -0.759  -0.751  -0.753  -0.762  -0.766  -0.757 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Unemployment  0.033  -0.048  -0.077  -0.069  -0.047  -0.084  -0.073  -0.072 
  [0.476]  [0.338]  [0.120]  [0.166]  [0.344]  [0.090]  [0.138]  [0.145] 
R&D intensity  0.220  0.124  0.118  0.126  0.123  0.110  0.120  0.119 
  [0.000]  [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.015]  [0.007]  [0.008] 
Transport infrastructure  0.036  0.056  0.051  0.050  0.056  0.052  0.052  0.051 
  [0.034]  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Schooling rate  1.114  0.873  0.753  0.753  0.881  0.754  0.777  0.767 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Specialization  0.239  0.361  0.301  0.303  0.364  0.302  0.311  0.307 
  [0.014]  [0.000]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Italy  ---  ---  -0.505  -0.457  -0.752  -0.482  -0.421  -0.487 
  ---  ---  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
North West  ---  -0.801  ---  -0.350  ---  ---  ---  --- 
(excl. Lombardy)  ---  [0.000]  ---  [0.121]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Lombardy  ---  -0.109  ---  ---  0.646  ---  ---  --- 
  ---  [0.355]  ---  ---  [0.000]  ---  ---  --- 
North East  ---  -0.737  ---  ---  ---  -0.278  ---  --- 
  ---  [0.001]  ---  ---  ---  [0.226]  ---  --- 
Centre  ---  -0.783  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.351  --- 
  ---  [0.000]  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.036]  --- 
South  ---  -0.663  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.121 
  ---  [0.001]  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.560] 
Constant  -11.210  -9.882  -9.366  -9.433  -9.847  -9.371  -9.583  -9.348 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Ln r  6.169  5.758  5.751  5.777  5.754  5.752  5.792  5.753 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Ln s  5.061  4.515  4.547  4.568  4.509  4.548  4.585  4.545 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Log likelihood  -3682.1  -3653.1  -3663.3  -3662.0  -3653.3  -3662.5  -3661.0  -3663.1 
N. obs.  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of FDI in each sector/period/region observation. Parameters are estimated with 
a negative binomial random effect panel method (see appendix 2). All regressions include a full set of 2-digit industry 
dummies and a dummy for three German regions outliers for infrastructures (not shown). r and s are parameters of the 
negative binomial conditional distribution. P-values in square brackets.   21




-  TAX WEDGE ON LABOR: Average Effective Tax Wedge, share of labour cost due to taxation (Source: 
OECD database on the tax/benefits positions of employees).  
-  EFFECTIVE AVERAGE CORPORATE TAX RATE: (Source: IFS)  
-  LABOUR REGULATIONS: Labour regulations (hiring and firing practices, minimum wages,..) do not 
hinder business activity (Source: IMD; 0=more restrictive; 10=less restrictive).  
-  BUREAUCRACY: Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity (Source: IMD; 0=less efficient; 10=more 
efficient).  
-  LEGAL  SYSTEM  AND  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  RIGHT:  Patents  and  copyright  protection  is 
adequately enforced in your country (Source: Frazer Institute; 0=less effective; 10=more effective). 
  1991  1994  1997 
  TAX WEDGE ON LABOR 
France   42.3  43.7  44.2 
Germany   37.2  39  41.2 
Italy   35.6  39.6  45.4 
Spain   31.8  34.6  32.7 
United Kingdom   23.5  25.3  24.2 
  LABOUR REGULATIONS 
France   4.3  4.2  2.8 
Germany   4.3  4.2  2.4 
Italy   2.7  2.8  2.1 
Spain   2.2  2.6  3.3 
United Kingdom   7.7  7.5  8.3 
  CORPORATE TAX RATE 
France   27.6  27.0  34.6 
Germany   51.8  46.1  49.2 
Italy   39.4  43.8  41.3 
Spain   31.0  27.5  27.5 
United Kingdom   28.4  28.4  26.6 
  BUREAUCRACY 
France   3.4  3.4  2.9 
Germany   3.8  3.8  2.9 
Italy   1.8  1.8  1.3 
Spain   3.3  3.3  3.8 
United Kingdom   4.9  4.9  5.1 
  LEGAL SYSTEM AND IPR 
France   7.7  7.5  8.1 
Germany   8.3  9.1  9.1 
Italy   7.7  6.5  7.7 
Spain   7.2  7.5  7.5 
United Kingdom   7.7  8.8  9.2   22
Table 3. – Regression results: the effects of national institutions and policies. 
  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
               
Market size  0.430  0.163  0.245  0.372  0.326  0.352  1.139 
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Market potential  0.643  0.322  0.340  0.546  0.433  0.507  1.272 
  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Agglomeration  0.066  0.215  0.156  0.077  0.080  0.105  --- 
(overall)  [0.122]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.052]  [0.062]  [0.058]  --- 
Agglomeration   0.583  0.646  0.657  0.617  0.644  0.632  --- 
(foreign)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  --- 
Wage  -0.742  -0.768  -1.012  -0.739  -0.757  -0.931  -0.802 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Unemployment  0.032  -0.068  -0.142  0.035  -0.001  -0.019  0.114 
  [0.569]  [0.170]  [0.005]  [0.524]  [0.992]  [0.764]  [0.081] 
R&D intensity  0.103  0.112  0.086  0.108  0.110  0.082  0.051 
  [0.019]  [0.012]  [0.054]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.067]  [0.318] 
Transport infra  0.032  0.056  0.060  0.033  0.035  0.044  0.040 
  [0.064]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.058]  [0.043]  [0.014]  [0.053] 
Schooling rate  0.424  0.623  0.512  0.511  0.661  0.225  0.463 
  [0.019]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.000]  [0.260]  [0.032] 
Specialization  0.597  0.195  0.300  0.526  0.478  0.445  1.641 
  [0.000]  [0.103]  [0.002]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.000] 
Italy  -0.537  -0.537  -0.442  -0.016  -0.439  0.074  -0.323 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.908]  [0.000]  [0.816]  [0.314] 
Tax wedge on labour  -0.740  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.021  -1.755 
  [0.000]  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.944]  [0.000] 
Corporate tax  ---  0.222  ---  ---  ---  0.119  -0.870 
  ---  [0.105]  ---  ---  ---  [0.477]  [0.000] 
Legal system  ---  ---  1.276  ---  ---  0.994  1.061 
  ---  ---  [0.000]  ---  ---  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Bureaucracy  ---  ---  ---  0.709  ---  0.822  0.607 
  ---  ---  ---  [0.000]  ---  [0.088]  [0.212] 
Hiring/Firing costs  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.244  -0.092  -0.382 
  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.000]  [0.618]  [0.047] 
constant  -11.150  -8.412  -9.965  -13.216  -11.186  -13.105  -22.234 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Ln r  6.144  5.851  6.107  6.028  5.847  6.322  4.089 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Ln s  4.943  4.653  4.888  4.802  4.621  5.081  2.777 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Loglikelihood  -3655.2  -3662.0  -3652.9  -3652.6  -3657.2  -3643.9  -3740.0 
N. obs.  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120 
Notes: as in Table 1   23
Table 4. – Regression results: asymmetric effects of national institutions and policies. 
Main Effect  Interaction with area dummy  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lombardy    0.393  -3.239  8.573  -3.338  1.272  2.286 
    [0.219]  [0.379]  [0.325]  [0.178]  [0.045]  [0.044] 
North West    -0.338  6.921  13.318  -2.786  -0.327  -0.731 
(excl. Lombardy)    [0.371]  [0.388]  [0.482]  [0.595]  [0.729]  [0.725] 
North East    -0.300  -9.999  3.883  -4.599  1.030  2.817 
    [0.425]  [0.205]  [0.833]  [0.405]  [0.213]  [0.123] 
Centre    -0.336  -2.542  6.041  -3.186  0.425  1.217 
    [0.329]  [0.650]  [0.649]  [0.403]  [0.565]  [0.414] 
South    -0.302  12.728  42.054  -10.563  -0.246  -0.404 
    [0.432]  [0.091]  [0.019]  [0.050]  [0.787]  [0.831] 
Tax wedge on labour    -0.264  -0.203  -0.169  -0.036  -0.059  -0.033 
    [0.390]  [0.529]  [0.587]  [0.912]  [0.862]  [0.923] 
  Lombardy  ---  1.011  ---  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  [0.331]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  North West  ---  -1.946  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  (excl. Lombardy)  ---  [0.377]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  North East  ---  2.656  ---  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  [0.216]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  Centre  ---  0.626  ---  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  [0.685]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  South  ---  -3.523  ---  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  [0.090]  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Corporate tax    0.033  0.015  0.157  0.173  0.007  0.012 
    [0.842]  [0.930]  [0.390]  [0.334]  [0.969]  [0.943] 
  Lombardy  ---  ---  -2.187  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  [0.349]  ---  ---  --- 
  North West  ---  ---  -3.662  ---  ---  --- 
  (excl. Lombardy)  ---  ---  [0.472]  ---  ---  --- 
  North East  ---  ---  -1.106  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  [0.823]  ---  ---  --- 
  Centre  ---  ---  -1.701  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  [0.633]  ---  ---  --- 
  South  ---  ---  -11.389  ---  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  [0.018]  ---  ---  --- 
Legal system    0.987  1.000  0.688  0.575  0.931  0.904 
    [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.053]  [0.111]  [0.003]  [0.004] 
  Lombardy  ---  ---  ---  2.012  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  [0.116]  ---  --- 
  North West  ---  ---  ---  1.358  ---  --- 
  (excl. Lombardy)  ---  ---  ---  [0.609]  ---  --- 
  North East  ---  ---  ---  2.313  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  [0.406]  ---  --- 
  Centre  ---  ---  ---  1.573  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  [0.417]  ---  --- 
  South  ---  ---  ---  5.283  ---  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  [0.050]  ---  --- 
Bureaucracy    0.618  0.787  0.691  1.068  1.232  1.301 
    [0.199]  [0.183]  [0.154]  [0.039]  [0.057]  [0.046] 
  Lombardy  ---  ---  ---  ---  -1.056  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.102]  --- 
  North West  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.707  --- 
  (excl. Lombardy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.620]  --- 
  North East  ---  ---  ---  ---  -1.988  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.116]  --- 
  Centre  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.792  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.409]  --- 
  South  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.668  --- 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.605]  --- 
Hiring/Firing costs    -0.027  -0.089  0.001  -0.112  -0.233  -0.253 
    [0.885]  [0.694]  [0.997]  [0.551]  [0.322]  [0.283] 
  Lombardy  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -1.615 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.085] 
  North West  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.858 
  (excl. Lombardy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.676] 
  North East  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -2.944 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.109] 
  Centre  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -1.232 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.376] 
  South  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.580 
    ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  [0.751] 
Log-likelihood    -3631.8  -3628.3  -3628.3  -3628.4  -3628.8  -3628.8 
N. obs.    3120  3120  3120  3120  3120  3120 
Notes: as in Table 1. Each regression have been run controlling for regional characteristics and sector dummies as in model (1) of Table 3 
which, in order to save space, are not included in the table, but are available from the authors upon request.   24
Appendix 1. Data and variables 
The  data  on  inward  FDI  used  in  this  work  is  a  sample  of  5,354  location  choices  made  by 
multinational firms over the 1991-1999 period in 52 NUTS 1 regions (Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics) in the 5 largest EU countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and UK. The sample 
is a subset of the Elios (European Linkages and Ownership Structure) database, a project carried out 
at  the  University  of  Urbino.  The  Elios  database  collects  information  retrieved  from  Dun  & 
Bradstreet’s “Who Owns Whom” and from the Bureau Van Dijk’s “Amadeus” directory of firms 
located in Europe. For each firm the database contains the year of establishment, the ultimate owner, 
which allowed us to identify foreign-owned multinationals, the primary sector of activity (2-digit SIC 
code) and the region where firms are registered. Such information is available at various degrees of 
aggregation  in  the  different  countries.  To  allow  for  cross-country  comparisons  we  used  regional 
aggregation at NUTS 1 level, available for all countries. The distribution of our sample by countries is 
remarkably similar to the corresponding distribution of inward FDI over the same period reported by 
UNCTAD, suggesting that we have a good representation of the various countries.  
For the econometric analysis we aggregated our firm-level data by region, sector and time, and we 
estimated a negative binomial regression model in which the dependent variable is the number of 
foreign entries in a given NUTS 1 region in a given two-digit SIC manufacturing sector and in three 
consecutive periods (1991-1993; 1994-1996, 1997-1999) for a total of 3,120 observations (52 regions 
x 20 sectors x 3 periods). Independent variables have been selected according to the existing literature 
on location choices of multinational firms, in order to provide the more accurate representation of the 
potential attractiveness of each region. Table A.1 describes the variables and relative sources whereas 
Table A.2 presents the descriptive statistics.  
Table A.1. - Variable List and Description, regional variables 
 
  Variables  Description  Source  Type 
Market 




Log of the sum of value added in all 
regions r ≠ i weighted by the inverse 
euclidean distance between the major 
cities in r and i 
Eurostat  Region-Time 
Overall agglomeration  Log (cumulative number of 
establishments)ijt  Elios  Region-Sector-
Time  Agglomeration 
Economies  Foreign-firms 
agglomeration 
Log (cumulative number of foreign-
owned)ijt  Elios  Region-Sector-
Time 
Wages  Log (labor costit / number of 
employeesit)  Eurostat  Region-Time  Local labor 
market 
Unemployment Rate  Log (Unemployment rate) it  Eurostat  Region-Time 
Technology  R&D intensity  Log (R&D95i / VA95i)  Eurostat  Region 
Regional policy  Transport Infrastructure  Index of transport infrastructure stock 
in region i at 1995 
Confidustria-
Ecoter  Region 
Human capital  Secondary schooling 
enrolment 
Log (Students enrolled in sec. school at 
1995 / Total pop. aged 10-19)  Eurostat  Region 
Specialization  Normalized Balassa 
Index 
(Xijt/Xjt) / (Xit/Xt) 
with X=number of firms  Elios  Region-Sector-
Time   25
 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics, regional variables 
 
Variable  mean  Standard dev.  min  median  max 
Market size  11.15  0.76  9.58  11.10  12.95 
Market potential  13.46  0.34  12.61  13.56  14.22 
Agglomeration (overall)  2.97  1.56  0.00  3.14  7.74 
Agglomeration (foreign)  1.84  1.33  0.00  1.79  5.97 
Wage  2.70  0.35  1.58  2.73  3.49 
Unemployment  2.29  0.51  0.83  2.26  3.49 
R&D intensity  0.34  0.63  -0.87  0.41  2.18 
Transport infra  2.13  3.50  0.25  1.11  21.43 
Schooling rate  4.43  0.21  4.05  4.40  5.14 
Specialization  -0.10  0.35  -1.00  -0.07  0.94 
 
Appendix 2: Simulation technique 
Simulations 
Simulations  have  been  run  in  the  following  way.  First,  we  predicted  the  value  of  the  dependent 
variable for each region of interest (North-West, Lombardy, North-East, Centre, and South) given the 
actual value of the regressors. As some regressors are industry specific, we computed 20 predicted 
values, one for each two digit industry. Then we repeated the prediction setting each regressor at its 
mean value in the EU countries other than Italy. Finally, we computed the average (by sector) of the 
prediction based on both modified and original regressors and we computed the percentage change due 
to the change of the regressor. In the case of Italy, we followed the same procedure but the prediction 
value in the first stage is computed at the average value of the regressors in all Italian regions. 
 
Table 5. Simulation results. Percentage increases in FDI in Italian regions if regressors 
were set equal to the average of EU countries other than Italy, period 1997-99 
 
  Italy  North-West  Lombardy  North-East  Centre  South 
Market size  7.62  -2.59  -19.75  -6.96  4.74  34.81 
Market potential  9.19  -4.24  -3.46  0.91  1.1  26.02 
Wage  -24.44  -5.17  -4.08  -18.01  -17.81  -37.8 
Unemployment  0.17  -0.55  -1.22  -1.48  -0.51  0.88 
R&D intensity  6.34  2.01  4.21  9.71  4.1  9.57 
Schooling  5.57  5.72  6.60  5.55  5.06  5.66 
Transport infrastructures  6.03  5.83  4.48  6.22  5.16  6.88 
Note: The simulations are carried out with the estimates obtained by a regression which included all regressors 
of model (14) in Table 3, except the dummy for Italian regions  